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World Income Components: 
Measuring and Exploiting International Risk Sharing Opportunities 
Abstract 
We provide methods of decomposing the variance of world 
national incomes into components in such a way as to indicate the 
most important risk-sharing opportunities, and, therefore, the 
most important missing international risk markets to establish. 
One method uses a total variance reduction criterion, and 
identifies risk-sharing opportunities in terms of eigenvectors of 
a variance matrix of residuals produced when country incomes are 
regressed on world income. Another method uses a mean-variance 
utility-maximizing criterion and identifies risk-sharing
opportunities in terms of eigenvectors of a variance matrix of 
deviations of country incomes from their respective contract-year
shares of world income. 
The two methods are applied using Summers-Heston [1991] data 
on national incomes for large countries 1950-1990, each using two 
different methods of estimating variances. While these data are 
not sufficient to provide accurate estimates of the requisite
var1ance matrices of (transformed) national incomes, the results 
are suggestive of important new markets that could actually be 
created, and show that there may be large welfare gains to 
creating some of these markets. 
KEY WORDS: Risk Management, National Incomes, Derivative Markets 
World Income Components: 
Measuring and Exploiting International Risk Sharing Opportunities 
In this paper, we develop methods for characterizing the 
risk structure of world incomes and for producing definitions of 
a small number of securities that will allow us to create new 
markets for much of this risk. Our methods are related to 
principal components analysis applied to national incomes 
(strictly speaking, gross domestic products, GDPs), of the 
nations of the world. Our methods take account of the relative 
size and variability of different countries' incomes, as well as 
the tendency of certain national incomes to move together, to 
suggest the most important opportunities for risk sharing. Our 
methods differ from standard principal components analysis 
applied to national incomes in that ours are variance 
decompositions of risk-sharing opportunities, not of national 
incomes themselves. Our data consist of the Penn World Table data 
on annual real per capita GDPs for the twelve largest (in terms 
of 1990 GDP) countries 1950-90, measured in 1985 US dollars; see 
Summers and Heston [1991] . 1 
A product of our analysis is a set of world income 
components, or indexes (that is, linear combinations) of national 
incomes, designed to be used as the basis of settlement for risk 
management contracts. We will refer to the contracts, claims on 
components of world incomes, as income component securities; we 
1our methods have some similarities to one suggested in the 
theoretical paper of Duffie and Jackson [1989]. 
would expect these contracts to be traded on securities markets 
just as other securities are traded today. They might also be 
called income component futures contracts and be traded at 
futures exchanges. 2 Some of our proposed securities can be 
described as insurance policies for certain groups of countries; 
calling a security an insurance policy is most appropriate when 
the variation in the index is highly negatively correlated with 
the income of one country, and the people in that country buy the 
security to reduce their income risk. Some of the income 
component securities can also be described as swaps of certain 
groups of national incomes for other groups; calling a security a 
swap is most appropriate when the index gives negative weights to 
roughly half of the national incomes. 3 Our analysis does not 
begin with any preconceived notions whether we want to create 
insurance policies or swaps, or any other instrument: our 
analysis goes directly for the most advantageous risk-sharing 
arrangement. 
Our study of risk-sharing opportunities among national 
incomes is potentially very important, since national incomes are 
2The proposed contracts have aspects of both securities and 
futures. The "index participations" traded at the American Stock 
Exchange and the Philadelphia Stock Exchange in 1989 are 
analogous to the securities defined here; their trading launched 
a debate on whether they are securities or futures, and thus on 
how they should be regulated; see Shiller [1993a]. 
3we shall see below that even when our optimal securities 
can be thought of roughly as insurance policies, those that are 
defined by the second of our two methods below are really also 
always swaps since a swapping of risks is always involved with an 
optimally defined contract. 
2 
measures of total economic welfare of the countries, and since 
there have been historically large variations in real national 
incomes. Moreover, there is very little effective risk 
diversification across nations today (see for example Obstfeld 
[1993], Tesar and Werner [1993]). We will do a consumer-surplus 
analysis below that will further confirm the importance of our 
proposed markets. 
In Shiller [1993a] (see also Shiller [1993b]) it was 
proposed that markets be established for long-term, even 
perpetual, claims on national incomes; it was argued that, 
despite some potential problems, such markets are indeed 
feasible. Here, our income component securities will be defined 
as finite-term, T-year, claims on the indexes (linear 
combinations) of national incomes defined here. In our empirical 
work below we will consider securities with T of both ten and 
forty years. Ideally, there would eventually be securities for an 
array of horizons and for perpetual securities, so that people 
with different circumstances in terms of years of life expected 
or number of heirs could find a security tailored to their 
interests. 
Because there do not now exist any markets for national 
incomes or for any large income aggregates, when we set up any 
such markets we must consider how they would work pretty much in 
isolation. Existing markets are very small in comparison: Our 
stock and bond markets are claims on only a tiny fraction of 
national incomes; for example, dividends account for only about 
3 
3% of US national income. Real estate is mostly highly illiquid, 
and costly to diversify, and in any event real estate income is 
also a small component of national incomes. 
In attempting to define a small number of income component 
securities markets that will allow maximal risk sharing given the 
number of markets, we seek to define the best first market to set 
up, as well as the best second or third markets. We assume that 
the number of markets introduced must be kept small, especially 
at the beginning. By analogy, there are not many stock index 
futures markets in the world, indeed, from a world perspective, 
not many aggregate liquid risk management markets at all. 
Another reason for confining our attention to only one or a 
few markets is that it is useful for us to be able to prescribe 
in simple terms the most important risk management actions that 
should be taken by large groups of people. Simple prescriptions 
are what most people take from existing models. The mean-variance 
capital asset pricing model (CAPM) in finance, to which our 
methods are related, is most often used by practitioners not to 
arrive at complicated definitions of optimal portfolios, but just 
for the simple prescription that investors should hold the market 
portfolio of investable assets, and we now have many indexed 
funds that were designed to allow them to do just this. The 
problem with this commonly-given prescription is that it is not 
really the logical consequence of the foundations of the CAPM, 
since it disregards the correlation of investment returns with 
innovations in the present value of other income, other income 
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which is much larger in the aggregate than income from existing 
investable assets. We seek here to devise methods to replace this 
simple prescription associated with the CAPM with a more sensible 
simple prescription, though any such prescription cannot be taken 
until the new markets are created. 
We shall assume that the earnings people make in the new 
income component securities markets are consumed, not invested 
either in physical capital or in technological research, so that 
we do not need to calculate the effects of investments on future 
income suggested by models of Romer [1990], Grossman and Helpman 
[1991], and Obstfeld [1995]. We also disregard the fact that a 
component of national incomes is nontradable, see Baxter, Jermann 
and King [1994]. Making adjustments in our analysis for such 
considerations is possible; we leave that to future research. 
We pursue two approaches to defining world income 
components, i. e., income indices, so that long-term claims on 
the indices can be traded for risk management. The first (Section 
II below) is a pure variance reduction strategy. With this 
strategy, in defining the income component securities, we assume 
that individuals in each country are interested only in reducing 
the variance of their income, and we constrain the ex ante price 
of the securities P to equal zero. We seek to define contracts 
such that excess demand is zero at a zero initial price for the 
securities, for countries that seek only to reduce risk in 
trading these securities. We then seek to define a small number 
of securities that allow for the most overall risk reduction 
5 
through risk sharing subject to the restriction on the number of 
securities. With this strategy, the method of defining securities 
has a clear and simple relation to principal components analysis: 
it turns out that the optimal securities are defined in terms of 
eigenvectors of a sort of variance matrix of residuals produced 
when national incomes are regressed on world income. 
A problem with our first method is that it does not allow 
any country to pay, in effect, a price, analogous to an insurance 
premium or to the schedule of fixed cash transfers that is part 
of some swaps between risky assets 4 , to induce another country 
to assume some of its risk. The second method (section III below) 
is a utility-maximization-based method, that assumes that 
countries have known identical utility functions, and derives an 
expression for the prices of the income component securities in 
general equilibrium. Securities are then defined so as to 
maximize social welfare. It turns out that the optimal securities 
are defined in terms of eigenvectors of a sort of variance matrix 
of deviations of national incomes from their respective contract­
year shares of world income. Having made a specification of 
utility functions, we are able with our second method to derive 
estimates of the consumer surplus generated by the creation of 
the new contracts. 
In Section IV below, we discuss how to apply our two methods 
of defining the income component securities to the data. Two 
4 see Kapner and Marshall [1990] for a description of the 
institutional details of such swaps. 
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methods of estimating variance matrices of national incomes are 
also used, a method that uses sample moments directly and a 
method that uses strong prior restrictions to estimate. In 
Section V we present results for both ten countries (unrestricted 
variance matrix) and twelve countries (restricted variance 
matrix), and in Section VI we interpret these results as 
suggesting genuine opportunities for important new markets. 
I. Definition of Contracts and Risk Structure 
In each of the new markets to be created, income component 
securities are to be traded that represent claims on a stream of 
world income components, that is, of index values, according to a 
standard contract specified by the securities or futures 
exchange. 5 At the beginning of a contract in the qth market, at 
contract year 0, the long in the contract agrees to pay, each 
contract year from t=l to T, an amount Pqt = Pq(l+g)t to the 
short in the contract, and to receive from the short Rqt' the 
year t "dividend" paid on the income component security, to be 
determined in year t according to a linear formula defined in the 
contract in year 0. The parameter Pq, which we will call the 
price of the contract, and the growth rate g, which we take equal 
to the anticipated average growth rate of real per capita gross 
domestic products, specified to keep the payment in line with 
expected growth of incomes, are specified in the original 
5A table of symbols and a table of basic relations appear 
near the end of this paper. 
7 
contract at year 0. The dividend Rqt is our qth world income 
component at year t, a linear function of national incomes 
accruing to year O populations in that year. National incomes in 
year t accruing to year O populations (which we will refer to 
here loosely as national incomes) are taken here to be per capita 
gross domestic products in year t times the corresponding 
populations of year 0. We will assume that each contract signer 
individually can be expected to earn his or her share of the per 
capita national income in subsequent years from sources other 
than the contracts we define here. The linear function of 
national incomes specifying the dividend is defined in the 
initial contract at year O so that the present value over T years 
of the function is defined to have an expectation, conditional on 
information at year 0, of 0. We are assuming here that public 
expectations of future real per capita national incomes are 
objective public knowledge, so that contracts can be written in 
terms of these expectations, though in practice some rough proxy 
for the expectations would have to be used by contract designers. 
Our use of expectations in the contract definition is essentially 
only a normalization rule for price; if contract designers 
misrepresent public expectations when they design the contract, 
then the result will only be a change in the market-clearing 
contract price; the initial contract price at year O will then 
not have the interpretation we give it. Even if they do specify 
the expectations correctly at year 0, as time goes by, there will 
be new information about expected future national incomes, and so 
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the conditional expectations of the present value of the linear 
function of national incomes at the future dates will no longer 
be zero. New contracts, initiated after year 0 that also expire 
at Twill have different prices, and those who entered a contract 
at year 0 and wish to get out of the contract before year Twill 
have to make a settlement in terms of the new price. However 
these future sales are not our focus of attention here. We study 
the contracts from the standpoint of the year they are initiated, 
year 0, only. 
Let us define the lxC random vector X whose cth element, c = 
1, ... ,C, is the present value in year 0 (the year the contract is 
made) of real per capita national income for country c for the 
years 1 through T minus the expectation at year 0 of this present 
value, all times population of country c in year 0. 6 Thus, 
taking E0 as the expectations operator conditional on information 
available at year 0, we have that E0X = 0 and the conditional 
variance matrix for T-year present value of national incomes 
accruing to current populations is Q = E0 (X'X). X will be 
redefined as a T x C matrix and Q will have a different 
interpretation in Section III below. 
The qth income component security has a present value of 
dividend payout Rqt' t = l, .. . ,T, equal to Rq = XAq, where Aq is 
a C x 1 element vector whose cth element is the fraction of 
national income of country c that is paid as part of the dividend 
6 In practice, we use real gross domestic product to proxy 
for national income. We use a constant real discount rate, the 
same for all countries, equal in our empirical work below to 2%. 
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on one security in market q. Assuming that there will be Q 
different kinds of securities traded, 0 < Q < C, let us create a 
Q-element vector R whose qth element is Rq and a C X Q matrix A 
whose qth column is Aq. Then, R equals XA, and R will be the 
present value of our desired vector of world income components, 
i. e., index values. (R will be redefined in Section III below as 
a T x Q matrix.) 
Let us suppose that the portfolio weights A defining the 
securities are normalized so that E(R'R) = I, where I is the Q x 
Q identity matrix. This normalization means that the variance of 
the present value of T years of dividends (dividends measured in 
thousands of 1985 dollars), summing from t = 1, .. . ,T, is one, 
and the covariances of the present value of T years of dividends 
with the present values of T-years of dividends of all other 
markets are zero. This normalization has no effect on the 
market's ability to form portfolios using the securities. The 
normalization will have the effect of tending to make the 
elements of A very small, so that contract size is suitable for 
trading by individuals. 
II. The Pure Variance Reduction Method of Designing Securities 
With the pure variance reduction method of this section, we 
seek to design income component securities whose price P defined 
at the date of the beginning of the contract, t=O, is zero. 
Designing contracts whose price is zero initially is analogous to 
underwriters' designing bonds to sell at par on issue. Note that 
10 
since we have demeaned national incomes, trading in the zero­
price contracts at the initial date has no effect on one's 
expected, as of that date, present value of future income. 
A representative individual in country c seeking at year 0 
to hedge his or her income risk can minimize the variance of T­
year present value of income in terms of the Q securities by 
regressing minus his or her share in the T-year present value of 
national income of country c onto the QT-year present values of 
dividends. The vector of the sum across all individuals in 
country c of theoretical regression coefficients is Pc= 
-E(R'R)- 1E(R'Xc). Since E(R'R) = I, Pc= -E(R'Xc) = -A'Qc where Qc 
is the cth column of Q. The optimal hedge for country c 
(individuals in country c considered together) will be to 
purchase a number Pqc of the qth security so that the unexpected 
component of that country's income is offset as well as possible 
by opposite dividends in the portfolio of securities, minimizing 
the variance of the combined incomes. 7 Let us combine the C 
vectors Pc, c = 1, ... ,C into a Q x C matrix P whose qth column is 
pq, and sop= -A'Q. It may seem unrealistic to assume, as we do, 
that everyone hedges; however our analysis would have been 
unaffected had we assumed that only a fraction of the population 
hedges, so long as this fraction did not vary across countries. 
Let us now infer how designers of new markets might 
construct the Q securities in such a way that they would allow 
7R p~ lS · measured in units of number of contracts for each 
country, so that Pqc will presumably be a very large number, in 
contrast to the very small value of Acq· 
11 
r 
the best possible compromise over the C countries, for the 
purpose of allowing them to hedge well. Obviously, any given 
country would prefer that a market be set up specifically for 
hedging risks to this country's income, but such a market might 
not serve other countries well. To achieve a compromise, we want 
to minimize a weighted average of the various countries' hedging 
error. This means that the designer must select the matrix A 
(select terms of the contract) to minimize, by some metric, the 
combined errors made by everyone. The metric for the combined 
expected squared errors that we will use is S = 
tr(wE0 ((X+R~) '(X+R~))), where w is a diagonal matrix with 
strictly positive elements along the diagonal. Sis the expected 
squared error for each country c weighted by we (the cth diagonal 
element of w) and summed across countries. In our empirical work 
with this method, we will make w = I so that all countries have 
the same weight. 
Now, note that S = tr(wE 0 ((X+R~)' (X+R~))) = tr(Ml-~'Q) = 
tr(Ml) - tr(A'QM2A). To minimize S, we must maximize tr(A'QM2A) 
subject to the constraint A'QA =I.Moreover, we have an 
additional constraint that the total positions are zero; for 
every short there must be a long; this constraint represents the 
essential motivation in our analysis that we are looking for 
risk-sharing opportunities, not just ordinary principal 
components of income. Thus, we have that ~t = 0, where tis a C x 
1 vector of ones. 
12 
Let us first solve this maximization problem for the case of 
only one market, where the matrix A is a column vector. To 
maximize subject to the two constraints A'OA = 1 and A'Qt = 0 we 
set up the Lagrangian L: 
L = A'O wOA - (A'DA-1) Ji. - (A'O 1) µ (1) 
where A andµ are Lagrange multipliers for the two constraints. 
Differentiating with respect to A, we derive the first order 
condition: 
aL/aA = 20 wOA - 20AA - D tµ = 0 (2) 
Premultiplying the above equation by A', and, using the facts 
that A'Qt = 0 and A'OA = 1, we show that A= A'nwnA = ~wf3'; this 
is the total weighted variance reduction, the weighted sum of the 
variance reductions across all countries. Premultiplying by t', 
we also show, again using A'Qt = 0, thatµ= 2t'~/(t'Qt). 
Substituting forµ in equation (2), we find: 
so that A is proportional to an eigenvector, and A is the 
corresponding eigenvalue, of the matrix that premultiplies A on 
the left hand side. It is instructive to write the same equation 
in terms of~: 
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(0 - 0 1 (1'0 1) - 1 1'0) wjJ' = M'OMwjJ' = p';., (4) 
M = I - 1(1'0 1)-1 1'0 
It will be recognized that the matrix M defined in the above 
expression is the idempotent matrix such that XM is the matrix 
whose ith element is the residual when the ith column of X (ith 
country's demeaned present value of income) is regressed on world 
present value of income. Thus, M'OM (which equals OM) is the 
variance matrix of residuals for each country, when each 
country's Xis regressed on world present value of income Xt, and 
hence, if w = I, ~, is (proportional to) an eigenvector of this 
matrix. Our world income component R is XA (which equals 
-.xQ- 1 ~'); this is, if w = I, proportional to the first principal 
component of XM, that is to XMj3'. To see this point, write XMJ3' 
as .xn-10Mf3' and use the fact that 0Mf3' = ~'A 
Having solved the one-component case, let us now move to the 
general case. Disregarding, for the moment, the constraint that 
the A'QA should be diagonal, requiring only that its diagonal 
elements be one, we set up the Lagrangian: 
where Aq, q = l, .. , Qare Lagrange multipliers for the constraint 
that diagonal elements of A'QA equal one, and whereµ is the Q x 
1 vector of Lagrange multipliers for the market clearing 
constraints. Differentiating with respect to the matrix A, we 
find: 
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~~ = 20 wOA - 2QAA - Q 1µ' = o (6) 
where A is a Q x Q diagonal matrix with the Aq along the 
diagonal. Premultiplying (6) by A', we see that A'QAA = A'.Q'MlA.. 
Premultiplying (6) by t', one finds thatµ' equals 
2t',Q'MlA/(t'.Qt). Substituting in (6) forµ', we then have: 
or, in terms of~: 
(O - a 1 (1'0 1) - 1 1'0) wP' = M'OMwlJ' = P'A ca> 
M= I- 1(1101)-1 11 0 
Premultiplying (8) by w· 5 , we see from the above expression that 
w· 5 ~ has columns proportional to eigenvectors of the real 
nonnegative definite symmetric matrix w· 5M'OMw· 5 , and hence ~wf3' 
is diagonal. Using~= -A'.Q, we see that A'.Q'MlA is also diagonal, 
and hence, using A'QAA = A'.Q'MlA, we see that A'.QA is diagonal 
too, so the constraints that were not represented in the 
Lagrangian, that off-diagonal elements of A'nA are zero, are 
satisfied anyway; A'nA is the identity matrix, and we thus know 
that A'.Q'MlA = A. To maximize the trace of A'.Q'MlA. we select the Q 
eigenvectors with the highest eigenvalues. 
The matrices A and~ are related by a couple of expressions. 
The matrix A equals -Mwf3'A- 1 . To see this, note that expression 
(7) is M'MlA = AA, and use the fact that QA=~,. Hence, since M 
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is idempotent, MA= A. Let us define a cxc matrix D equal to I­
tt'/C. This is the matrix such that, for any vector x, Dx is the 
vector x from which the mean of all the elements of x have been 
subtracted, i. e., Dx is demeaned x. Note that Dis both 
idempotent and symmetric, with rank C-1. Note also that DM = D 
and MD= M. It follows that, if w = I as in the empirical work 
below, ~,=-DA.A, which means that columns of~, are the same as 
columns of A, except that they are demeaned and rescaled by 
multiplying by minus the corresponding eigenvalue. To see that~, 
= -DAA in this case, note that since, when w = I, A= -Ml3'A-1 , DA 
= -DMj3'A- 1 ; since DM = D, DA= -D~'A-1 . Using the fact that D~' = 
~', the result follows. Note also that~= ~D = ~M. Because of 
these relations, we can write the portfolio vectors in several 
different ways: R = XA = (XM)A = (XM)DA. 
I+ A~ is the C x C matrix whose ijth element is the 
exposure, after hedging, of country j to country i's risk. If we 
include all possible components (that is, setting Q equal to C-1) 
so that the (C - 1) eigenvectors of w· 5M'!2Mw· 5 are complete, 
then, using (8), we see that M'QM =~'~.Then it can be shown 
that, regardless of the weighting matrix w chosen, A~= -Mand 
I+A~ = ty where y is the vector of regression coefficients when 
each country's present value of real income is regressed on the 
present value of world real income, that is, y = (t'Ot)-1 t'O. 
That I+A~ = ty means that each country is holding a portfolio 
whose risk is the fitted value of its national income regressed 
on world income; everyone is completely diversified and subject 
16 
to world income risk only. But such diversification does not 
generally occur unless we have C-1 markets. 
To clarify what we have done, consider the case where the 
world consists of four countries, and that the first two 
countries are highly correlated with each other, but uncorrelated 
with the second two countries. Moreover, the second two countries 
are highly correlated with each other and all four countries have 
the same variance. Our Q matrix is given by expression (9): 
1.0 0.9 0 0 
0.9 1.0 0 0'1= (9)
0 0 1.0 0.9 
0 0 0.9 1.0 
Then, M'OM has the form given by expression (10), 











- .47 5 -.475 .425 .525 
which has one eigenvalue equal to 1. 9 and two eigenvalues both 
equal to 0.1. The vector A, derived as shown above using the 




A= .3627 (11) 
1 
1 
Thus, except for scaling, the component may be described as just 
a short position in the first two countries and an equal and 
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opposite long position in the other two. This contract is, as we 
might expect, a swap between the two blocks of countries. This 
component is quite different from the first principal component 
of Q. That matrix has two first principal components, both with 
the same eigenvalue. These components are proportional to the 
vectors [1 1 0 O]' and [0 0 1 1] '; if we created a market in 
either of these, then we would not provide any means for the two 
groups of countries to swap their risks. The vector~ is given by 
expression (12) . 
p = .6892[ 1 1 -1 -1] (12) 
The first two countries are short the component, the second two 
are long the component. 
If we were to create the next two markets, then each of 
these markets would entail a swap between the pairs of countries 
within one block. The risk reduction afforded by such swaps is 
much smaller because the countries are so highly correlated 
within each pair. 
It is instructive to look at the matrix I+ A~ whose ith 
column gives the exposure of country i to risks in each of the 
18 
four countries after hedging in the one market, expression (13). 
Not all elements of this matrix equal .25, as would be the case 
if we had included all three possible markets and thereby spanned 
the world risk sharing opportunities, resulting in each country's 
holding one quarter of the world. Since we have only one market 
for trading income, it is not possible for each country to hold 











.25 .25 -.25 .75 
the world income, but the holdings shown in expression (13) do 
nearly as well for risk reduction, given the covariance matrix Q 
that was assumed. For example, for country 1 the holding of .75 
times its own income minus .25 times country two's income is 
almost as good as the holding of .25 times its own income and .25 
times country two's income, given the high correlation between 
the two. 
Suppose, to pursue this example further, that we changed the 
weight matrix w from the identity matrix to a matrix that gives 
much more weight to the first two countries, but keeping the 
weights constant within each country pair. This change in weights 
would have no effect on any of our optimal securities. Even if 
the contract designer cares primarily about the variance 
reduction of the first two countries, there is still nothing 
better that the market designer confined to one market can do for 
them than create a swap between this pair of countries and the 
19 
other pair. And, if there is to be a second market, the best that 
can be done is to have a swap between the first two countries; if 
a third market, between the last two countries. If, on the other 
hand, the contract designer cares primarily about the first 
country, giving much more weight to it and equal weight to the 
other three countries, then the optimal first market will look 
very different; it will be approximately a swap between the first 
country and the rest of the world. Thus, giving unequal weight to 
countries that are in groupings within which countries are highly 
correlated with each other can break the grouping up for contract 
definition. 
We note, finally, that with the pure variance reduction 
method there is a convenient way of measuring the importance of 
each market. We can regress the cth country's national income on 
the qth world income component, and take the variance of the 
fitted value in this simple regression, as the explained sum of 
squares for that country and market; this variance is just ~ic· 
Since all of the components are independent of each other, the 
sum of these variances (L(q=l, .. . Q)~ic) is the variance of the 
fitted value in a multiple regression on all of the components; 
if we add to this variance the variance of the residual in the 
regression, we get the total sum of squares, which is just 
var(Xq). In our empirical work below we will show for each 
market, as a measure of its importance, the explained sum of 
squares as a percent of the total sum of squares. 
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III. A Utility Maximization Method for Defining Securities 
A problem with the assumptions that led to the above-defined 
income component securities is that it was assumed that no 
country could pay, in effect, an insurance premium to another 
country to assume some of its risk. In the above framework, if, 
let us suppose, there were one country whose national income had 
no risk at all, and another with high risk, there would be no 
opportunity for risk sharing between them. In this example and 
the pure variance reduction framework, the country with no 
uncertainty could achieve no further reductions in uncertainty, 
and so would not be interested in making any risk-sharing 
arrangements. In fact, however, it is logical that a country that 
had no risk could be induced to bear a little risk in exchange 
for an increase in the expected value of its income. 
We now hypothesize that individuals in all countries share 
the same mean-variance utility function. We allow P, the vector 
of prices of the Q securities arrived at at time 0, to be 
nonzero. We derive the demand for each income component security 
by all countries, and derive the market clearing price. The 
contract designer, assumed to know the utility functions, chooses 
a number Q of income component securities to maximize a weighted 
sum of the expected utilities, i. e., to maximize a social 
welfare function. Note the difference from the analysis of the 
preceding section, where the contract designer was required to 
find securities such that the markets would clear at a zero price 
for countries interested only in reducing variance. 
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The utility function that we hypothesize (the same for 
individuals in all countries) is: 
where ute is felicity, or instantaneous utility, of an individual 
in country cat year t, and pis the discount rate, i. e., 
subjective rate of time preference. The felicity ute is defined 
by the function of mean and variance: 
Yte a var (Yte) 
Ute = COflStantte + (15)
2 (Yoe ( 1 +g) t) (a+l) 
where Yte is the mean, the expectation conditional on information 
at year O (contract date) of country e's real per capita income, 
and var(Yte) is the variance conditional on information at year 0 
of country e's real per capita income at year t. The term 
Yoe(l+g)t, where we take Yoe to be, for each country c, its 1990 
per capita income (for the CIS, 1989 income) in US 1985 dollars, 
enters the expression for proper scaling of the mean and 
variance, taking account of the standard of living of the 
country. The coefficients chosen for the mean and variance of Yte 
may be motivated approximately as coming from a linearization of 
constant relative risk aversion felicity for an individual at 
time t in country c, U(Yte) = ( (Yte) (l-a)_l) / (1-a) around 
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Yoc(l+g)t, where a is the Arrow-Pratt coefficient of relative 
risk aversion. Strictly speaking, the linearization of u(Ytc) 
would have an additional term, a deterministic term in (Ytc -
Including this term in the felicity function would 
destroy linearity of the demand functions, and thereby create 
large complications in our analysis; in any event if prices paid 
are not too large (as shares of national incomes) the term is 
small. For this reason, it is customary with the capital asset 
pricing model in finance to omit this term. 
Let us define the TxC random matrix X whose tcth element is 
real per capita national income Ytc at year t for country c minus 
the expectation at year O (the date the contract is made) of this 
national income, times population in country c in year O; as 
above this is assumed to be national income accruing to 
population in year O who sign the contract. The qth security is 
assumed to be a claim for each year t = 1, ... ,Ton income equal 
in amount to the tqth element of the linear combination XA of 
incomes. 8 The vector P has qth element equal to the price of the 
qth security. Note that these prices can be both positive or 
negative; in this sense they may be considered as analogous to 
the fixed schedule of cash transfers that are seen on certain 
swaps between risky assets; both sides of the contract are 
8 rn this section on mean-variance utility, we use bars 
over symbols A, M, ~ and y that will be compared with variables 
in the preceding section on pure variance reduction; for 
simplicity we omit bars over R, S, w, X, Aq, A, and Q even though 
their values too may differ from those of corresponding symbols 
in the preceding section. 
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contractually committed to the contract; there is not free 
disposal, and so there is no problem with negative prices. There 
is, in fact, a fundamental arbitrariness in the sign of 
eigenvectors, and the sign of each element of P depends on the 
choice made for the sign of the eigenvector; in our empirical 
results presented below we choose the sign to make all prices 
nonnegative. 
For country cat year t we have that the hedging reduces 
expected income xtc by the purchase price times the number of 
contracts, that is, by ~~P(l+g)t. The variance var(xtc) of income 
after everyone hedges is 
t=l, ... , T (16) 
where Qtcc is the cth diagonal element of Qt and Qtc is the cth 
column of Qt· Let us define Q for the utility maximization method 
as the discounted sum, using discount factor h = 
1/((l+p) (l+g)a+l), of the variance matrices for national incomes 
t periods hence, Q = L(t=l, .. . ,T)htnt. Since, with demeaned X, 
E0X = 0, Q equals E0 (X'GX) where G is a diagonal matrix whose tth 
diagonal element is ((l+p) (l+g)a+l)-t. The normalization we choose 
for A is A'QA =I.To derive the demands for the securities by 
all individuals in country c, we convert our expressions for mean 
and variance into per capita measures, substitute them into the 
mean-variance utility function, multiply by population, take the 
present value overt= 1, .. . ,T, use this definition of Q, and 
differentiate with respect to ~c· The demand is then found to be: 
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where T = (v-vT+l) I (l-v) and v = l/ ( (l+p) (l+g)a-l), so that Tis 
the present value of a T-year $1 annuity discounted using 
discount factor v. Note that demand in market q is not affected 
by prices in the other markets; this property of demand is a 
consequence of the fact that the dividends on the securities are 
constructed to be uncorrelated with each other, and of the mean­
variance utility assumption. This demand curve implies that 
country c will purchase more of the security the lower the price 
and the lower the country's covariance with the security. It will 
hold a positive quantity of a security at a positive price only 
if the covariance is sufficiently negative so that the security 
is providing enough risk reduction to the country to warrant 
paying the price. Note also that a country whose own income is 
riskless will hold negative quantities of all securities, that 
is, be a seller of securities, (since we are normalizing all 
securities to have nonnegative price). This means that in terms 
of these markets it is strictly in the insurance business, of 
accepting risk in return for an insurance premium. 
Representing this demand function for all countries, using 
the matrix~ whose cth column is the demand for country c, we 
have: 
p = -A'O - Pl'x/f/a (18) 
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where x 0 is a diagonal matrix whose cth diagonal element is xoc· 
The vector of prices Pis determined so that the total 
demands for the securities is zero, i. e., so that ~l = 0. Using 
this market-clearing condition and solving for the price vector P 
we find: 
p = -aA'01 ( Tt'Xol) -l {19) 
This means that the price of the ith security is the average, 
over all countries, of the (weighted present value, t = 1, ... ,T) 
covariance of that securities' linear combination of incomes with 
the incomes of the countries, divided by the average x 0 c, 
multiplied by -a, and divided by T. A security whose dividend 
correlates positively with the average country's income will have 
a negative price, a security whose dividend correlates negatively 
with the average country's income will have a positive price; we 
are normalizing the contracts so that price will always be non­
negative, and so that no contract's dividend correlates posi­
tively with the average country's income. The price of the qth 
security is zero if the sum over the C countries of the regres­
sion coefficients of country e's income on Rq equals zero. 9 
9Note that the four-country example presented in the 
preceding section in connection with expression (9) applies here 
with the utility maximization method too if all four countries 
have same x 0 c, since then M = M. This is then an example where P 
= 0 even in our utility maximization case. 
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A special case will help clarify the general equilibrium 
that we have just derived. Suppose that there are only two 
countries, that a=l and T = 1. Suppose also that only the first 
country has any uncertainty; therefore, since A'ni = 1, the 
vector A must have first element equal to ±1/cr1 where cr1 = i2:ii 
(the other element is irrelevant, ~ 2 is zero). Resolving the 
sign ambiguity with principal components, let us choose the minus 
sign so that price will be positive. It follows from expression 
(19) that P = cr1 /(x01 + x 02 ). The amount of the security purchased 
by the first (risky) country is, from expression (18), Px02 ; the 
amount purchased by the other country is of course the negative 
of this. After hedging, the risk is borne by the two countries in 
proportion to their incomes (at the point of linearization), so 
that the ratio of post-hedging standard deviation to income (at 
the point of linearization) is equalized across countries. The 
value in year O of the "insurance premiums" that are paid is ~ 1P 
and total insurance premiums divided by the income of country two 
is (crf/.zj1 )/(l+x02 /x01 ) 2 . If the second (riskless) country is much 
smaller than the first, then the total value of the insurance 
premiums divided by national income of the second country will be 
large, approaching crf/.zj 1 as we decrease x 02 to zero, but the 
amount of risk shared will be small relative to the national 
income of the first country. This is as we might expect: there is 
no way that a large risky country can improve its situation very 
much if the only other country is very small, and it can make a 
big difference to the small country to accept a small part of the 
27 
large country's risk. If the second (riskless) country is larger 
than the first, then the "insurance premium" will be small, 
approaching zero relative to either country's income as isx 02 
increased to infinity, and the first country will get rid of 
almost all of its risk. This too is as we might expect: the risk 
suffered by the small country is easily borne by the larger 
country, and since the risk is small for the larger country it is 
willing to bear it for a small total value of insurance premiums. 
Let us now consider the contract designer's problem, which 
is to define a small number Q of securities so as to maximize a 
weighted sum of utilities, a sort of social welfare function. We 
assume that the contract designer wishes to choose A to 
maximize: 10 
C 
S = ~ wcuc (20) 
c=l 
where we is the weight in the social welfare function on country 
c. Letting w denote the CxC diagonal matrix whose cth diagonal 
10 rn future research, we might represent the contract 
designer as also maximizing with respect to the time schedule of 
price payments, which we have here exogenously set as growing at 
rate g. Since we do not represent credit markets in our model, 
choosing the wrong time path for price payments in the contracts 
may make the contracts less effective. The paths through time t, 
t = 1, .. . ,T of the conditional variance matrix of income Qt and 
of the expectation of future income EoXt could be modelled, and 
the optimal time schedule of price payments would generally 
depend on these paths. 
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element is the weight given to the utility of country c, we can 
rewrite this social welfare function as: 
where Yo is a C x C matrix whose cth diagonal element, c = 
1, .. . ,C is the real per capita income in country c in year O and 
where the constant does not depend on A. If one substitutes our 
expression for Pand regroups, one finds that this expression 
reduces to: 
1--s =constant+ (a/2) tr(wy0-"x0- P'P). (22) 
Thus, to maximize the social welfare function one need only 
maximize tr(wyoaxo1P'P) with respect to A subject to the three 
constraints: P = -(A'Q+TPt'x0 /a), P = -a.A'Qt(Tt'x0 t)-1 , and A'DA 
= I. Substituting the second constraint into the first, we find 
that P' = -A'OM where Mis defined as I - t(t'x0 t)-1 t'x0 . The CxC 
matrix Mis not the same as the matrix Min the preceding 
section, though it too is idempotent, of rank C-1. Substituting P 
= -A'OM then into tr(wyoaxo1P'P), we find that we are left with 
the problem of maximizing tr(wyoaXo 1M'nii'OM) = 
tr(A'0MwyoaXo1.M'OA) subject to the single constraint that A'DA = 
I. 
To maximize we set up, as in the preceding section, the 
Lagrangian that represents the constraint that diagonal elements 
29 
of A'OA equal 1, but that disregards the constraints that off­
diagonal elements equal 0: 
where Aq is the Langrange multiplier for the constraint that the 
qth diagonal element of A'OA equals 1. Differentiating with 
respect to the matrix A and setting the derivative to zero, we 
find the first order condition: 
where A is a diagonal matrix whose qth diagonal element is Aq. 
Since P' = -M'OA, this equation can be rewritten in terms of P: 
from which it can be seen that (wy0ax01 ) · 5~' has columns 
proportional to eigenvectors of the matrix 
(wy0ax01 ) · 5iJ'Q.vi(wy0ax01 ) .S. Since this matrix lS nonnegative 
definite symmetric, P'wyoaxa 1 P' is diagonal. Using P' = -M'OA, we 
see that A'.D.Mwyoaxa 1M'OA is also diagonal. Premultiplying (24) by 
A' I we see that A'D.Mwyaaxo 1M'ni = A'.QiA, and so A'OA is diagonal 
too, and the constraints omitted from the maximization problem 
above, that off-diagonal elements are zero, are satisfied anyway. 
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The matrix M'OM is a sort of present value (using discount 
factor h = 1/((l+p) (l+g)a+l) of the variance matrices t = 1, ... ,T 
of the vector of national incomes minus their corresponding 
shares of world income. For country c, the excess national income 
is computed as that country's national income minus its share of 
world income, the latter defined as Ye= x 0c/(t'x0 t), so that the 
share is determined in terms of our point of linearization, here 
1990 real per capita GDPs. This is in contrast to the preceding 
section, where M'OM was the variance matrix of present values (t 
= 1, .. . T) of residuals of real per capita national incomes 
regressed on the present value (t = 1, ... T) of world real per 
capita incomes. 
We now show that all of our contracts designed by the 
utility maximization method will be essentially swaps. First note 
that as in the preceding section, the matrices A and~ are 
related by a couple of expressions. Premultiplying (24) by ,n-l 
and using~= -A'OM, we see that the matrix A equals 
-Mwyoaxo1 ~'A-1 . Hence, since Mis idempotent, MA= A. It follows, 
since t'x0M = 0, that t'x0A = 0. This means that the sum of the 
contract shares of national incomes times the corresponding base­
year income will be zero. We cannot have a situation in which all 
elements of a column of A are positive, as was a possibility with 
the A matrix defined from the pure variance reduction method. 
Note that DM = D, where D = I - tt'/c is as above. Note also 
that~= ~D = ~M. Because of these relations, we can write the 
portfolio vectors in several different ways: R = XA = (XM)A = 
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(XM)DA. In words, it does not matter whether the data that are 
used to construct the dividends are first corrected by 
subtracting from each country its share of world income or if in 
this case the A is also demeaned by column. 
We can now produce measures that place a dollar value on the 
availability of these income component securities; given our mean 
variance utility function, these measures might be called either 
consumer surplus or equivalent variation or compensating 
variation; with mean-variance utility the measures are identical. 
For each of the Q securities and each of the C countries we can 
calculate the value in time O dollars of the utility change, by 
calculating what decrement in time O income would just offset the 
utility increase. Putting it another way, we can calculate, in 
~qc - Pq space, the area of the triangle bounded by the 
equilibrium price Pq, the line ~qc = 0 and the linear demand 
curve given by equation (18). Note that this consumer surplus 
includes both the value of the variance reduction caused by the 
hedging and the value of the price received (if the country was a 
net seller of securities, as when the country was serving as an 
insurer of other countries' risks). The QxC matrix F whose qcth 
element is total dollar value of the utility gained by using 
market q by country c as a fraction of GDP (x0c) is given by: 
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where the exponentiation is element-by-element, that is, for 
country c and income component security q, the consumer surplus 
is just (a/(2)) (~qclxocc) 2 • Note that this expression gives us the 
total dollar present value of felicity gains in all future 
periods t = 1, .. . ,T as a fraction of expected income in the base 
year only; to convert this to a fraction of GDP paid each year t 
= 1, .. . ,Tone would have to divide by T. 11 Note also that the 
weighted sum, weighted using the weights for each country given 
by the matrix w, of all the elements of the matrix F defined in 
expression (26) equals the expression maximized above, 
tr(A'00wy-oaxa 1.M'OA), see expression (23), times a constant. The 
first market thus maximizes the weighted sum of the consumer 
surpluses divided by national incomes for one market, the second 
the weighted sum of the consumer surpluses divided by national 
incomes for the second market, and so on. Thus, of course, when 
we choose was something other than Y'5x01 , thereby choosing to 
maximize a weighted sum, not the simple sum, of consumer 
surpluses divided by national incomes, our apparent success in 
generating consumer surplus by creating only a few markets, to 
someone viewing a table presenting a matrix F such as appears 
below, will not be as high as it could be. 
11For example, in our Tables II and III below, when T = 40, 
one would divide by T = 11.48. Such a calculation would give that 
constant fraction of income that would be deducted each period t 
= 1, .. . ,T to just offset the overall utility gain from creating 
the new markets. Because of the heavy discounting in our Table II 
and III results, this fraction would tend to be far below the 
value of felicity gained as a fraction of income in that year for 
years near the end, near year T. 
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IV. Data Analysis 
Time series plots of the ten-year growth rates of real per­
capita GDP series for the ten largest countries for which we have 
GDP data 1950-1990 are shown in Figure 1. It is immediately 
apparent that there has been a lot of variability of these growth 
rates for certain countries. In Japan, the growth rates have 
varied from 26%% to 153%. In Brazil, they have ranged from -8% to 
nearly 99%. Plainly, changes in income of these magnitudes over 
ten-year intervals matter a lot to those receiving the income, 
and sharing the risk of such changes would have proven very 
beneficial to these people. These fluctuations in GDPs are very 
real; this is in contrast to the earthquakes or meteor impacts 
that theoretical economists often tell stories about, but which 
appear never in history to have caused economic dislocations that 
were remotely as big. 
It is also apparent that the different countries have 
substantially different income growth paths through time, and 
that there is no simple shared pattern to the growth paths that 
would inspire confidence that we know how to forecast them far 
out. It is also apparent from the plots that there is a tendency 
for neighboring countries to be substantially positively 
correlated with each other, and that distant countries may be 
uncorrelated or even negatively correlated with each other. Some 
correlations are estimated to be negative: India and Japan happen 
to show large negative correlation over this period. Because 
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there is not much information about correlations in these data, 
which are dominated by low-frequency movements and for which we 
have no secure model, we cannot attach much confidence that 
national incomes in these countries really tend to move opposite 
each other. 
For our analysis, we must convert these general impressions 
into some estimates of the matrices Q. Estimating the variance 
matrices is not a trivial matter; these are supposed to reflect 
the conditional variance at the time of the contract for distant 
future national incomes. To estimate such a variance matrix, we 
need first to form some representation of the conditional 
expected value each year for all future national incomes, a 
problem that the world's macroeconomic forecasters have been 
spending decades to develop. 
There are very many models that might be used to provide 
estimates of Q. Estimating time series models, such as 
autoregressive models, for the national income of each country 
would help us to separate out which components of national 
incomes are forecastable and which are not. There is, however, a 
risk inherent in specifying any simple autoregressive model, that 
it will not capture accurately the long-term risks that we want 
to hedge. Estimating spatial models, such as the spatial 
autoregressive models or other Markov random field models, would 
allow us to put structure on the matrix Q so that fewer 
parameters would be estimated, so that our shortage of 
information about long-run risks would present less of an 
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estimation problem. Spatial models could use sophisticated 
concepts of economic distance between countries, or prior 
information about the similarity of different countries. There is 
a risk in any spatial model specification, though, that we may be 
using the wrong measure of economic distance between countries, 
and therefore impose incorrect priors or restrictions on our 
variance matrices. 
It is beyond the scope of this paper to set forth a 
definitive treatise on how to estimate Q; we leave that for 
possible future work. For this paper we used two very simple 
methods to estimate, methods that appear to be transparent and 
fairly robust to many kinds of possible misspecification, with 
the hope that our estimates will be at least suggestive of the 
new markets that may be created. Our methods of producing the Q 
matrices will at least capture in some fashion the magnitude of 
variability of national incomes, the tendency for much of this 
variability to be idiosyncratic, and the tendency for some 
measure of comovement across countries, even if the estimated 
matrices are not highly accurate. At this stage in our research, 
we approach the problem in almost the same spirit that real 
business cycle modelers have who "calibrate" their models. We are 
hoping to tell a simple story that has an important element of 
truth in it, and are not now particularly interested in testing 
our variance matrix model against general alternatives; even if 
the model were rejected the estimated Q may yet be useful for our 
purposes. 
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Our two methods of estimating ,Q differ in what they assume 
about the representativeness of past historical movements for the 
future. Our Method A, which involves estimating simple 
unconstrained variance matrices from historical data, makes no 
assumptions about similarities of or economic distances between 
countries. This method, since it requires a lot of data, is used 
only for a rather low T, equal to ten years; even with this low 
T, we do not expect to get accurate estimates of variances. 12 
Our Method B, which involves estimating constrained variance 
matrices, imposes some strong priors and thereby saves degrees of 
freedom so that we have better prospects of estimating variance 
matrices with high T; with Method B we use T equal to forty 
years. Neither method makes use of time series models to infer 
conditional moments; both are based on the assumption that 
conditional variances of long-horizon changes in income are best 
estimated directly as moments of long-horizon changes themselves. 
Our motivation is the notion, based on our reading of other's 
12we have only four nonoverlapping time intervals with which 
to compute variances of ten-year present values. Supposing that 
the variables are normal and independent across the four time 
intervals, and approximating our variance as estimated from four 
such observations, then the variance estimate will be 
x2proportional to a variate with three degrees of freedom, and 
an 80% confidence interval for a standard deviation is from 80% 
of the estimated standard deviation to 262% of the estimated 
standard deviation. We have not tried to produce standard errors 
for our variance matrices, since such standard errors would 
depend on the assumed model for our processes and there are many
possible models to which we at this point attach prior 
probability. Further refinement of our knowledge about Q is left 
to later work. 
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success in forecasting, that ten- or forty-year changes in 
national incomes are virtually unforecastable. 
Method A. For the pure-variance-reduction calculations, to 
estimate Q, we take the sample variance matrix for the C 
countries of GDP1990x(L(i=l, ... ,T)gdpt+i/((l+p)igdpt) with sample 
period t = 1950, ... , 1990-T, 41-T observations, where GDP denotes 
total, not per capita, gross domestic product in 1990 (in 1985 
dollars), and gdpt denotes real per capita gross domestic product 
in year t (in 1985 dollars). For the utility-maximizing case, to 
estimate Qi, i = l, ... ,10, we take the sample variance matrix for 
the C countries of GDP1990 x(gdpt+i/gdpt) with sample period t = 
1950, ... ,1990-i, 41-i observations. We then form our estimated Q 
as L(t=l, ... ,T)Qt/((l+p) (l+g)a.+l)t. 
Method B. With this our second method of estimating Q, we 
impose prior restrictions that all countries have the same mean 
and variance of percentage changes in real per capita income, and 
that covariances are determined solely by the geographic 
distances between countries. The motivation for requiring that 
all countries have the same mean and variance of percentage 
changes of real per capita income is some skepticism that the 
past exigencies that faced particular countries 1950-90 can 
really be expected to repeat in those same countries in the 
future. Our figures show that Japan has had much higher growth 
rates than most of the other countries. Do we really have reason 
to expect that growth rates will be similarly higher in the 
future in Japan? Our figures suggest that Japan and Brazil are 
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risky countries. Do we really have any reason to think that these 
countries will be the ones facing the greatest risks in the 
future? Perhaps they are just buffeted by some major crises in 
this sample, crises the likes of which may just as well strike 
other countries in the future. The motivation for requiring that 
the correlation across countries in changes in real per capita 
income depends only on the distance between the countries is much 
the same, we do not really attach much credence to the suggestion 
of simple variance matrices computed by Method A that India and 
Japan should be expected to be negatively correlated in the 
future. 
Our prior assumptions for Method B about the variance matrix 
V of T-year percentage changes in real per capita national 
incomes are represented by the formula: 
a - bd .. b?.O1.J 
where d,1.J• is the distance between countries i and j, measured as 
air miles between the major city in the respective countries. We 
used the air mile distances between the major cities Montreal, 
Mexico City, New York, Rio de Janeiro, Calcutta, Tokyo, Paris, 
Berlin, Rome, London, Shanghai, and Moscow. Since bis positive, 
the further away the major city, the less is the covariance with 
its country. This formula corresponds to a valid (i. e, the 
variance matrix is nonnegative definite for any placement of 
cities) isotropic (i. e., the model is invariant to rotations of 
the coordinate system) spatial model where the cities lie in ~2 , 
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see Cressie [1991, p. 86]. The formula also corresponds to a 
valid isotropic spatial model where the cities lie on the surface 
of a sphere and distances are measured along great circles, as in 
our application to the earth. Moreover, the variance matrix is 
strictly positive definite unless two cities coincide. This 
formulation restricts all covariances to be positive. The prior 
restriction that all covariances are positive may seem strong, 
but it is maintained here as a sort of common sense prior notion 
that there is really no reason in general for any pairs of 
countries to tend to move opposite each other. This restriction 
may serve to reduce the possibilities for diversification, by 
eliminating the negative correlations that diversifiers seek. 
For the pure variance reduction case, we compute the constrained 
maximum likelihood (multivariate normal) variance matrix V for 
the 10 countries of zc = L(i=l, .. . ,T)gdp1990 /(gdp1990_i(l+p)i) c = 
1, ... ,10; there is only one observation of zc for each country, 
but there are only three unknown parameters of the utility 
function, a, b, and the mean growth rate. Using the estimated 
parameters, a, and b, and the mean growth rate, and then using 
distance data and real national income data for China and the CIS 
(the latter including the Baltic countries, so that it 
corresponds to the former Soviet Union), we construct using (27) 
a twelve by twelve Vmatrix for the twelve countries, and using 
the Summers-Heston data for real GDP for all countries in 1990, 
we construct a twelve by twelve matrix for all twelvex0 
countries. Then we take Q = x0 vx0 . For the utility-maximizing 
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case, to estimate Vi, i = l, ... ,40, we take the maximum 
likelihood variance matrix for the 10 countries of 
(gdp1990/gdp1990-i), one observation for each country. We construct 
the forty twelve by twelve Vi matrices as we did in the pure 
variance reduction case, and the resulting forty variance 
matrices are each multiplied by ((l+p)-i(l+g)-(a+l)i)) and summed 
to produce our estimate of V; Q is then taken to be x0v.x0 . 
Note that the maximum likelihood method will tend to produce 
downwardly biased estimates of variance, since with only one 
observation for each country, the estimated mean will tend to 
pick up the component of the variation that is shared by all 
countries; recall that in the iid case the maximum likelihood 
estimate of variance is sum of squared residuals divided by N 
rather than N-1. The downward bias will be more severe here than 
in the iid case, since our countries are positively correlated 
with each other by assumption. Still, the maximum likelihood 
estimate is the posterior mode based on uninformative priors, and 
we think that this conservative estimate of variance is 
acceptable for our purposes. 
Our methods also require that we specify a weighting matrix 
w for our maximization problems that define the contract weights, 
that are represented in the matrices A and A. In our pure 
variance reduction method, we take the matrix w to be the 
identity matrix I: we are merely minimizing total variance. This 
weighting matrix preserves a simple correspondence between our 
method and principal components analysis. In our utility 
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maximizing approach, we use two different w matrices. One of 
these is w = y'sx0 ; this matrix gives most weight to the large 
countries in terms of real gross domestic product. We used this 
matrix because we think that large wealthy countries provide more 
fertile ground for establishing innovative new markets; we want 
the benefits of the new markets to be large there. Moreover, with 
w = Y5Xo thew matrix and the y 0ax01 matrix cancel in the matrix 
whose eigenvectors we take, making for the closest parallel with 
the pure variance reduction method here. The other w we will use 
for the utility maximization method is the identity matrix I. 
This allows our method to downweight the people in wealthier 
countries, effectively since their marginal utilities of income 
are lower than with those in the poorer countries; they tend to 
benefit less from risk management. This weighting scheme is 
implied by our interpretation of our mean-variance utility 
function as a linearization of a constant-relative-risk-aversion 
utility function with coefficient of relative risk aversion, a. 
This choice of weights will mean that should two countries, 
identical in terms of per capita income, be lumped together, then 
our analysis would yield the same results as if the two countries 
were treated separately; we are really maximizing the total 
utility of individuals, under the assumption that individuals 
within each country are identical. 
We must finally specify the anticipated growth rate g, the 
risk aversion parameter a, and the discount rate p for our 
analysis. We took g equal to the average real per capita growth 
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rate of all ten countries from 1950 to 1990, 3.07% per year 
(except in Table IV). Empirical studies have found wildly 
different estimates of risk aversion parameter a and the discount 
rate p, depending on the kind of circumstances that generate the 
data, see Thaler [1990]. Values of a have been estimated in the 
100s, but these may be regarded as implausibly high; we chose a 
equal to three as representing a sort of consensus by many who 
work in this literature as a reasonable value to assume. We 
believe that the high discount rates that are sometimes estimated 
are evidence of judgmental errors that people often make, rather 
than true preferences. As Pigou [1934] argued long ago, people 
appear to have a "telescopic faculty" that is defective, causing 
them sometimes to underestimate the importance of the future. We 
assume that on decisions as important as hedging the standard of 
living, people will behave more rationally, and use a rather low 
discount rates, which we have set at 2%. 
In an important sense, our choice of g, a, and pimply 
implausibly high discounting. The figures we have specified would 
imply, using the constant relative risk aversion utility 
function, that the risk-free real interest rate would be 
(l+p) (l+g)a-1, or 11.7% per year, far above historical averages. 
This implausibly high implied risk-free rate is part of the 
equity-premium puzzle presented by Mehra and Prescott [1985] 
There does not appear to be any agreed-upon way to deal with this 
puzzle; we have dealt with this problem only in a rough way by 
presenting one last table that substitutes an expected growth 
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rate g of zero in place of the 3.07% used in the other tables, so 
that the puzzle is resolved by supposing that people do not 
expect past growth rates to continue. 
V. Results 
We present results (with Q = 2, two markets and the 
parameter values described above) for the pure variance reduction 
method and w = I, Table I; for the utility maximization method 
and w = .l"6x0 , Table II; and for the utility maximization method 
with w = I, Table III. Finally, we present utility maximization 
results using w = .l"6x0 where the growth rate g is set to zero, 
Table IV. In each table, the results are presented first for 
variance matrix estimation method A (unconstrained) and ten 
countries, and second for variance matrix estimation method B 
(constrained) and twelve countries. 
The estimated .Q matrices (not shown), whether constrained or 
unconstrained, show that near neighbors tend to have higher 
correlations than do more distant countries. 13 With the 
unconstrained variance matrices, covariances are usually positive 
with the exception of India, whose covariance is estimated to be 
negative with most other countries. With the constrained variance 
matrix estimates, all covariances are constrained to be positive. 
For the pure variance reduction case and constrained variance 
matrix estimate, corresponding to Table I panel B, the estimated 
13An appendix showing detailed results is available from the 
authors. 
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correlation between (forty-year present values of income in) the 
US and Canada is 0.88, between France and Germany is 0.80, 
between China and Japan 0.65. The estimated correlation between 
distant countries is quite small: the correlation between the US 
and Japan is 0.07, between the US and the CIS is 0.16, between 
the CIS and China is 0.19. India of course no longer has negative 
correlation with anyone: its correlation with China is estimated 
at 0.43, with Japan, 0.28, with the United States, 0.04. The 
pattern of correlations is similar in the utility maximization 
case, panels B of Tables II, III and IV. 
The optimal contracts shown in these tables are difficult to 
summarize. The contract definitions involve all countries, with 
varying weights, and so there is no simple way to describe them 
accurately in a few words. Moreover, the positions that countries 
take in these contracts are not the same as their weights in the 
contract definitions. In Table I where~, is proportional to a 
matrix of eigenvectors of M'OM and Table II and Table IV where~ 
is proportional to an eigenvector of M'OM, the columns of~, and 
~, are proportional to demeaned columns of -A and -A 
respectively. In these tables, therefore, the positions of most 
countries have the opposite sign of the corresponding weights in 
the contract definition, though this is not true for all 
countries whose contract weight is near the mean weight across 
countries in that market. In Table III, the relation between 
contract weights and positions is much less clear: countries with 
little weight in the contract definition sometimes taking large 
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positions, countries with large weight in the contract definition 
taking small positions. 
Let us make some broad generalizations about these contracts 
in terms of the contract weights, that is, in terms of the 
columns of A and A. In Tables I, II and IV, where large wealthy 
countries dominate in determining our results, the first contract 
can be described in rough terms as approximately a swap between 
US and the Far East (in panels A, the Far East is represented 
only by Japan, in panels B by Japan and China), though in Table 
panel A Germany also plays an important role. The second market 
in Tables I, II and IV is less easily described. In panels B, 
where we have added China and the CIS, the second market might be 
described in simple terms as a swap between the European 
community and CIS on one side, and China, Japan and the US on the 
other. In panels A of Tables I, II and IV, however, the swaps 
tend to put a lot of weight on Brazil. In Table III, where the 
utilities are unweighted, so that poorer countries become more 
important, the first market tends to be approximately a swap 
between the poorest country (in per capita income) and the rest 
of the world, the second market a swap between the second-poorest 
country and the rest of the world. 
Part of these results can be understood in terms just of the 
scale of the individual countries, to the extent that covariances 
are not of dominant importance. Scale can be measured in 
different ways, either in terms of the variance of the national 
income, or in terms of the per capita income, or in terms of the 
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population. Scale as measured by variance is useful in 
understanding the unconstrained variance matrix results with ten 
countries (Panels A). Japan has the highest variance of present 
value of national income, the US the second highest, and Brazil 
the third highest. (The United States is a low estimated variance 
country in terms of percentage changes in GDP, but it makes up 
for this in terms of sheer size, making our measured uncertainty 
about United States GDP the second largest of the ten.) Per 
capita income and sheer population matters greatly in our 
unweighted utility maximization results, Table III. India matters 
vastly more than any other country: it had a 1990 population over 
three times that of the next most populous country (the United 
States) in our list of ten countries and a per capita income only 
a little over a quarter that of the next-poorest of our ten 
countries, Brazil. The first market is obviously a swap of 
India's national income for the rest of the world's income; all 
the countries other than India have virtually the same 
coefficient in the first column of the A matrix; in this sense 
the contract is plainly designed for India's benefit. The market 
benefits India substantially, both in terms of the variance 
reduction it permits for India and from the price it receives for 
selling contracts, starting at a real $48.17 (in 1985 dollars, 
Table III panel A) for the first year for each contract, 
amounting to a real $13.47 per person in India, and growing at 
3.07% per year thereafter. 
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Note that with these utility maximization method results 
using aw matrix that gives so much weight to one poor country, 
the ratio of wei'ghts A /A for the fi'rst(other country)l (India)l 
security are very nearly a/(1-a) where a is India's share in 
world income as measured by our matrix. It might seem obviousx 0 
that a contract that was expressly designed for India should be a 
swap of India's national income for the world. But it should be 
remembered that our contract design method took into account the 
willingness of other countries to take the other side of India's 
positions, and the benefit to India of the price received. One 
might have thought that the other side of the swap would not be 
equal shares in all national incomes (which gives smaller 
countries less impact on the swap regardless of their covariance 
with other countries) but instead some variance-minimizing 
portfolio of national incomes. One might have thought that with 
our unconstrained variance matrix results, Table III panel A, 
India might have been even better off if we left the Japan 
component of world income out of the swap, since with our 
unconstrained variance matrix estimate Japanese national income 
is extremely volatile, and India winds up bearing some of the 
risk of Japanese national income. But, if we left Japan out of 
the swap, then India would not receive such a good price for 
selling the contracts. Note that India does not pay anything at 
all for this insurance of its national income risk, but profits 
from it. Japan uses this India/rest-of-the-world swap to reduce 
the variance of its own income, since Japanese income uncertainty 
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is fairly dominant part of the uncertainty represented in this 
swap, even though the weight given to Japan is small. Even 
though Japan was given very little weight by our contract 
designer, in consumer surplus terms, in Table III panel A, Japan 
benefits almost as much as India does from this contract, and 
Japan buys (according to the first column of the ~, matrix) 
nearly twice as many contracts as India sells. Japan benefits 
especially much because Japan's income is, in our unconstrained 
variance matrix estimate, negatively correlated with India's 
income. Other contracts that Japan buys are provided largely by 
the United States, who sells nearly as many contracts as India 
does (the US accepting thereby a 42.30% increase in its small 
real per-capita income variance), accepting some Japanese income 
risk in exchange for the real $48.17 per contract. Japanese real 
per capita income variance is reduced 51.68% by this one 
contract; Japan is able to reduce its variance dramatically more 
than the 2.75% in the pure variance reduction case because it 
pays other countries to take on its risk. Fortunately Japan does 
not need to pay very much for this variance reduction, only 1.08% 
of Japanese 1990 GDP. Even though the first column of the A 
matrix seems to give little weight to Japan, still, given the 
small estimated diagonal element of Q corresponding to India 
(only 3.79% of the element corresponding to Japan) and the 
negative correlation of India with Japan, this contract may 
actually be viewed, in variance reduction terms, as more nearly a 
risk-management contract for Japan, than one for India. India 
49 
reduces its real per capita income variance by 43.69% with this 
contract, a smaller percentage reduction than Japan achieves. 
One might have thought that China would show more importance 
than India in the Table III panel B utility maximization results, 
since it has a larger poor population. However, its population in 
1990 was only 36% larger than India's in 1990, and, offsetting 
this, its Summers-Heston real per capita income in India was only 
45% that of China. Note that neither of the markets in Table III 
panel B could be interpreted as designed for Brazil, as was the 
second market in the Table III panel A utility maximization 
method results. The inclusion of China for Table III panel B 
calculations, a country with only 60% the real per capita income 
and over seven times the population of Brazil in 1990, has bumped 
the market most important to Brazil to the third market (not 
shown in Table III panel B). The CIS, which, while its population 
was nearly twice that of Brazil, had nearly 40% higher real per 
capita income in 1990; has to deal in the fourth market (also not 
shown in Table III panel B) for its largest benefits. 
To help understand the sometimes great difference between 
the columns of the A matrix and the columns of the-~' matrix, 
consider the puzzle that in Table III panel B the second contract 
appears by the weights Ac2 that define this contract to be 
roughly an India/China swap, yet India sells (as shown by the 
positions P2 c) almost none of this contract, and produces from 
this sale the smallest consumer surplus of any country in the 
world. One might think that a contract designer would want to 
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leave India out of this contract altogether; it would appear that 
India is just adding extraneous noise to a contract that would 
otherwise be a China/rest-of-the-world swap. In fact, however, 
the benefit that India receives from this contract is important 
to our contract designer given the great weight that India 
receives in our social welfare function. Note that contract 1 
(defined by the weights Ac1 ) did not work out to be exactly an 
India/rest-of-the-world swap, since China was underrepresented in 
it. China was given sufficient weight in our social welfare 
function that it was treated differently from other countries in 
the first contract. With two contracts, India is now able to 
achieve an accurate swap of her income with all the world's 
income, since A. 1P + A. 2P is very nearly such a swap, the15 25 
discrepant weight on China standing corrected. China, using the 
first two markets together achieves (with A. 1P +111 A. 2P211 ) 
nearly a swap with world income too, except that India is 
overrepresented in the swap, a fact that is not too damaging to 
China given the relatively small contribution that India makes to 
the variance of the swap. 
To help understand the explained sum of squares over total 
sum of squares, consider the first market of Table I, panel A. 
The explained sum of squares over total sum of squares is 47.42% 
for the United States, indicating that this one security makes it 
possible for the United States to get rid of nearly half of its 
uncertainty about income, but it offers much less benefit for 
Japan as a percent of its variance. Japan derives less benefit 
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since its GDP variance is estimated to be three times higher than 
that of the next highest country, the US, and its income is 
substantially positively correlated with the US; there is in 
essence no one who benefits from taking on much of the Japanese 
risk. Japan has essentially exhausted most of its opportunities 
to lay off income risk; no one else has much risk to swap 
R2relative to Japan's. To understand this, note that the when 
Japan's present value of real per capita income is regressed on 
world present value of real per capita income as measured here is 
nearly ninety percent (given the substantial size of the Japanese 
economy in the world and positive correlation with most countries 
in the world), so Japan has achieved nearly all the possible 
variance reduction with these two markets. In other words, with 
our unconstrained variance matrix estimate, most of Japanese risk 
is market risk which is undiversifiable. 
To help understand the consumer surplus figures, note that, 
from equation (17), which defines ~c for any given country c, for 
any country whose real per capita national income is uncorrelated 
with Rq, ~qclXocc = -TPqla; all such countries have the same 
consumer surplus as a fraction of base-year income given by (26). 
How great this consumer surplus is depends on Pq; if the absolute 
value of Pq is small, there would be little benefit, i. e., 
little profit from insuring other countries against their risks. 
For a country for which real per capita national income covaries 
{positively or negatively) with Rq, the consumer surplus is 
greater if the covariance has the same sign as Pq. If the 
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covariance is of the opposite sign, there could even be no 
benefit at all to this country from trading in the market; the 
benefit the country might obtain from receiving an insurance 
premium for taking on other countries' risks could be wiped out, 
given the covariances, by the extra increased own variance caused 
by doing that. Thus, it is clear why the US benefits so little 
from its large position in the first market with the utility 
maximization contracts, Table III panel A; for the US price works 
opposite variance reduction; in this case the US gained on price 
but lost on variance. Our results with India in the first market 
were the opposite of this case: India's real per capita income 
correlates positively with R1 and the price P1 is also positive. 
A major factor tending to keep consumer surpluses down 
overall is the discounting in our calculations of the variance 
matrix Q caused by our assumed growth rate g of 3.07% per annum 
for real per capita incomes. The high historical growth rate 
means that marginal utilities of future income are lower, and so 
the uncertainty about the distant future matters much less today. 
If we alter Table II by substituting a growth rate of g = 0 in 
place of the g = 3.07% suggested by recent history, making, as 
discussed above, our implied risk-free rate come more in 
alignment with historical averages, then our consumer surplus 
figures increase dramatically; in Table IV panel B consumer 
surplus is increased by at least an order of magnitude, sometimes 
more nearly two orders of magnitude, when compared with Table II 
panel B. The Table IV results show that there is a possibility 
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that consumer surplus may be dramatically higher than we have 
estimated with our other tables, given our lack of certainty that 
we want to extrapolate the growth trends of the last forty years 
into the next forty. 
VI. Discussion 
Let us concentrate first on the Table II Panel B results 
that were derived under the premise that the contract designer 
wishes to maximize utility over a long time span and gives a lot 
of weight to the big countries. We concentrate on these results 
since, to manage standard-of-living risks, such long term 
contracts are very important for most people, and since such big 
wealthy countries appear to be the more fertile grounds for the 
establishment of major new markets. 
The best first market to set up was found to be 
approximately a swap between the US, on one side, and the Far 
East (Japan and China) on the other. In looking at this result, 
one may feel that there is a sort of intuitive sense to it, that 
some of the biggest economies should share their income risk. 
Still, one may wonder why the arrangement took just this form in 
our results, and what is it about the estimated variance matrix 
that led our methods to this form. One might have thought that 
the methods would have led us first to a swap between the US, the 
biggest economy of the world, on one side, and the rest of the 
world on the other, with the risk shared equally among the other 
countries of the world; indeed that is just the first contract we 
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would have found had we given much more weight (in our w matrix) 
to the United States than to any other country. But taking a 
position in such a swap would not be as beneficial to the other 
countries of the world, since most would not achieve variance 
reduction in their own incomes by taking the other side of such a 
swap, each of them being a small part of the swap defined by the 
contract. The United States would have to pay them a substantial 
amount to make them willing to take on this risk, a payment that 
would compensate them for accepting the increased variance; the 
increased variance and the payment received work in opposition to 
each other so that, in total, expected utilities in these other 
countries would not be so much improved. In contrast, the swap 
between the United States and Far East produces variance­
reduction benefits for both sides of the swap even without any 
price payment. The price paid is low; in Table II Panel B the 
total dollar value of the open interest (the sum of ~le for all 
countries for which ~le is positive times the price P 1 ) is only 
$31 billion, about one quarter of one percent of the twelve 
countries' combined GDP in 1990. This example illustrates the 
reason that our utility maximization results are basically 
similar to the corresponding pure variance reduction results 
(comparing Tables I and II): whenever covariances of country 
incomes with world income are proportional to country sizes (as 
measured by x 0 e), then the utility maximization method will 
produce contracts that are simple swaps at zero price, as with 
our pure variance reduction method. 
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The conclusion that the first contract is a US/Far East swap 
rests on our low estimated covariance between the US, on one 
side, and Far East on the other; if the US were highly correlated 
with the Far East, then we might better create a first contract 
that is a swap between the US and the Far East on one side and 
other blocks of countries, perhaps Europe, on the other. 
Alternatively, if one were to use some form of economic 
distances, rather than geographical distances, in our constrained 
variance estimation method, then we might possibly, for example, 
be led to a swap between advanced countries like the United 
States, Japan, and Europe on one 0 side, and less developed 
countries, on the other. Such an outcome would require, though, 
that the correlations among the advanced countries were quite 
high, otherwise the large scale of these economies would itself 
tend to result in a first market that is a swap among them. 
Considering such possibilities means making careful adjustments 
in our estimated variance matrices; the estimates presented here 
are hardly definitive evidence about the conditional variance 
matrices that we should hold subjectively today. 
If we attach more importance to helping poorer countries, 
that is, if we follow our utility maximization method to its 
logical conclusion without imposing any weights in the social 
welfare function, then the first new market to advocate would 
appear to be very nearly one for an India/rest-of-the-world swap, 
as shown in Table III Panel B. In this case, it hardly matters 
for contract definition whether the United States and Japan are 
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correlated with each other or not. With this new market, we would 
expect to see a situation in which all other countries 
voluntarily share India's risk in proportion to their own 
national incomes. 
One important lesson from our analysis is that there is a 
great difference between the superficial structure of an optimal 
contract and the resulting opportunities for risk management that 
the contract offers. When we allow our method to give (Table III 
Panel B) great weight to the poorest country, the first market, a 
swap between India and the world, has the appearance of a market 
that would serve only India. In fact, however, the (absolute 
value of the) covariance of real per capita national income with 
the dividend on this contract is much bigger for the United 
States than it is for India14 , and (with our constrained 
variance matrix results) the US buys more contracts than India 
sells. The mere fact that we gave so much weight to India in our 
method of designing contracts does not mean that only India 
benefits. Of course, the markets must offer advantages for richer 
countries, since even if our method stresses creating markets for 
the benefit of poorer countries, their counterparts in the richer 
countries must voluntarily agree to participate in the markets. 
In the case of the India/rest-of-world swap, the rest of the 
14with our utility-maximizing constrained-variance-matrix 
results, the correlation coefficient, using Q, between US 
national income and the dividend in the first market is -0.39, 
substantially lower in absolute value than the correlation 
coefficient between India and the dividend in the first market, 
which is 0.85. 
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world benefits so much that in fact they are willing to pay 
India, rather than be paid, for bearing India's important (given 
her low income levels) exposure to risk. That a product could be 
developed that would go a long way towards solving India's risk 
problem (reducing her variance by 66.10% in Table III panel B 
results) and yet be better than a free good for India is a sort 
of discovery that we might never have made had we not the benefit 
of the methods developed here. 
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FIGURE 1 
Ten Year Growth Rates of Real Per Capita GDP, Years Ending 1960-90 
Source: Computed from data from Summers and Heston [1991], 1950-90. 
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Table I 
Optimal Securities Designed Using Pure Variance Reduction Method 
w= I, p = 2% 
A. Unconstrained Variance Matrix, Ten Countries, Ten-Year Contracts 



















1 Canada 0.82 -.20 55.00% 4.01 -1. 09 16.54% 
2 Mexico .22 -.04 2.60% 3.97 -1. 04 14.78% 
3 USA 5.26 -1.34 47.42% 1. 06 2.76 2.01% 
4 Brazil .05 -.00 0.00% 8.68 -7.18 79.51% 
5 India -.75 .21 15.99% 3.01 .21 0.17% 
6 Japan -1. 98 .52 2.75% -3.05 8.12 6.68% 
7 France -.30 .09 2.27% 3.15 .03 0.00% 
8 Germany -2.29 .60 42.90% 4.40 -1.60 3.06% 
9 Italy -.82 .22 16.85% 2.90 . 36 0.44% 
10 UK . 26 -.05 6.81% 3.60 -.56 7.25% 
B. Constrained Variance Matrix, Twelve Countries, 40-Year Contracts 
Market 1 Market 2 
C Ael ~le ESS/TSS Ae2 ESS/TSS~2e
Weights Positions Benefit Weights Positions Benefit 
x10-11 xlo 10 % of (j2 x10-11 xl0 1 o % of (j2 
1 Canada -.24 -.35 34.13% .50 .06 0.94% 
2 Mexico -.32 -.16 7.20% .54 .03 0.25% 
3 USA 1. 38 -4.12 48.20% -.60 0.91 2.37% 
4 Brazil -.38 -.04 0.29% .65 -.06 0.61% 
5 India -.56 .39 11.64% .53 .04 0.10% 
6 Japan -.90 1.18 24.74% -.63 0.94 15.61% 
7 France -.44 .12 1. 30% 1. 35 -0.60 34.90% 
8 Germany -.48 .19 2.76% 1. 51 -0.73 39.98% 
9 Italy -.45 .14 2.20% 1.27 -0.54 32.81% 
10 UK -.43 .10 0.97% 1.29 -0.56 32.89% 
11 China -1. 28 2.06 36.51% -1.67 1. 75 26.13% 
12 CIS -.60 .49 5.72% 2.16 -1.24 36.93% 
Notes: Weight Aeq' q = 1,2, is fraction of country c detrended GDP paid 
as part of dividend on one security q; position ~qe' q = 1,2, is total 
number of securities q the theory predicts will be owned in country c; 
ESS/TSS is explained sum of squares over total sum of squares. Source: 
Calculations by authors using data 1950-1990 from Summers and Heston 
[1991]; see text. 
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Table II 
Optimal Securities Designed Using Utility Maximization Method 
w = Jf'6x0 , p = 2%, a= 3, g = 3.07% 
A. Unconstrained Variance Matrix, Ten Countries, Ten-Year Contracts 


















% of GDP 
1 Canada -.05 -.56 2.25% .67 .07 0.04% 
2 Mexico -.16 .02 0.00% .96 - .31 0.69% 
3 USA .64 -4.20 1.26% -1.15 2.45 0.43% 
4 Brazil -.12 -.20 0.17% 1. 72 -1.30 7.69% 
5 India .13 -1. 50 4.30% 1. 42 -.91 1. 56% 
6 Japan -1. 21 5.57 13.97% -.59 1. 71 1. 32% 
7 France -.26 .52 0.67% .79 -.09 0.02% 
8 Germany -.27 .61 0.71% 1. 62 -1.17 2.57% 
9 Italy -.26 .55 0.86% .97 -.33 0.30% 
10 UK -.00 -.82 1. 79% .82 -.13 0.05% 
B. Constrained Variance Matrix, Twelve Countries, 40-Year Contracts 
J_Market 1, Price = $14.42_, J_Market 2, Price = $6.41_, 
C Aei Pie Consumer Ae2 P2e Consumer 
Weights Positions Surplus Weights Positions Surplus
x10-i 0 x10 9 % of GDP x10-i 0 x10 8 % of GDP 
1 Canada .29 .16 17.37% 1. 01 .22 0.36% 
2 Mexico .49 .05 1. 95% 1.13 .02 .00% 
3 USA -3.25 1. 95 27.14% -1.29 4.04 1.17% 
4 Brazil .61 -.01 0.03% 1.38 -.40 0.72% 
5 India .95 -.18 6.26% 1.10 .07 0.01% 
6 Japan 1. 64 -.53 12.52% -1.30 4.06 7.41% 
7 France .72 -.06 0.95% 2.76 -2.68 17.55% 
8 Germany .78 -.10 1. 71% 3.11 -3.27 20.17% 
9 Italy .74 -.07 1. 50% 2.58 -2.38 16.21% 
10 UK .70 -.05 0.76% 2.64 -2.48 16.54% 
11 China 2.42 -.93 18.50% -3.95 8.45 15.43% 
12 CIS 1.05 -.23 3.19% 4.55 -5.65 19.44% 
Notes: Weight Aeq' q = 1,2, is fraction of country c detrended GDP paid 
as part of dividend on one security q; position Pqe' q = 1,2, is total 
number of securities q the theory predicts will be owned in country c; 
consumer surpluses, dollar value of expected utility gained (utility of 
the T years' income) as a fraction of the first year's GDP, are defined 
from positions using (26). Source: Calculations by authors using data 
1950-1990 from Summers and Heston [1991]; see text. 
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Table III 
Optimal Securities Designed Using Utility Maximization Method 
w = I, p = 2%, a= 3, g = 3.07% 
A. Unconstrained Variance Matrix, Ten Countries, Ten-Year Contracts 
!_Market 1, Price = $48.17_1 !_Market 2, Price = $8.16_1 
C .Ael ~le Consumer Ae2 Consumer~2e 
Weights Positions Surplus Weights Positions Surplus
x10- 9 xl0 8 % of GDP x10- 9 xl0 8 % of GDP 
1 Canada -.32 -.15 0.17% -.25 -.30 0.66% 
2 Mexico -.32 .18 0.24% .20 -.40 1.18% 
3 USA -.32 -1. 65 0.20% -.26 1.00 0.07% 
4 Brazil -.32 .09 0.04% 4.52 -2.04 18.88% 
5 India 3.96 -2.33 10.34% -.08 -.00 0.00% 
6 Japan -.32 4.10 7.56% -.28 1. 92 1.65% 
7 France -.32 .36 0.32% -.26 -.03 0.00% 
8 .Germany -.32 -.14 0.04% -.26 -.07 0.01% 
9 Italy -.32 .21 0.13% -.26 .01 0.00% 
10 UK -.32 -.67 1.22% -.25 -.09 0.02% 
B. Constrained Variance Matrix, Twelve Countries, 40-Year Contracts 
!_Market 1, Price = $16.89_1 !_Market 2, Price = $3.80_1 
C .Ael ~le Consumer Ae2 ~2e Consumer 
Weights Positions Surplus Weights Positions Surplus 
x10- 9 x10 8 % of GDP x10-10 x10 9 % of GDP 
1 Canada -.12 .66 3.14% .91 -.08 4.49% 
2 Mexico -.12 .22 0.35% 1. 02 -.04 1. 30% 
3 USA -.12 7.79 4.34% .91 -.89 5.64% 
4 Brazil -.12 -.05 0.01% 1.16 -.04 0.84% 
5 India 1. 84 -5.02 47.43% 6.88 -.03 0.20% 
6 Japan -.12 -1.11 0.55% .89 .42 7.87% 
7 France -.12 .49 0.58% .91 -.11 3.01% 
8 Germany -.12 .43 0.34% .91 -.12 2.76% 
9 Italy -.12 .22 0.14% .92 -.09 2.50% 
10 UK -.12 .49 0.63% .92 -.11 2.97% 
11 China -.07 -3.88 3.25% -6.81 1.26 34.53% 
12 CIS -.12 -.24 0.03% 1. 04 -.17 1. 72% 
Notes: See Notes to Table II. 
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Table IV 
Optimal Securities Designed Using Utility Maximization Method 
w = lPax0 , p = 2%, a= 3, g = 0% 
A. Unconstrained Variance Matrix, Ten Countries, Ten-Year Contracts 


















% of GDP 
1 Canada -.27 -.87 5.48% .44 .12 0.11% 
2 Mexico -.91 -.02 0.00% .64 -.48 1. 63% 
3 USA 3.87 -6.41 2.94% -.78 3.78 1.02% 
4 Brazil -.61 -.41 0.78% 1.15 -2.03 18.71% 
5 India .98 -2.54 12.23% .87 -1.18 2.65% 
6 Japan -7.67 9.02 36.56% -.35 2.50 2.81% 
7 France -1. 53 .81 1.59% .53 -.15 0.06% 
8 Germany -1. 61 .92 1.58% 1.10 -1.87 6.61% 
9 Italy -1.54 .82 1. 93% .65 -.52 0.79% 
10 UK .05 -1.30 4.54% .53 -.16 0.07% 
B. Constrained Variance Matrix, Twelve Countries, 40-Year Contracts 
1-Market 1, Price = $42.62_1 I_Market 2, Price = $20.18_1 
C .Ael ~le Consumer Ae2 ~2e Consumer 
Weights Positions Surplus Weights Positions Surplus 
x10-11 xlo 10 % of GDP x10-11 xl0 9 % of GDP 
1 Canada .41 .11 884.56% 1. 41 .16 18.68% 
2 Mexico .72 .03 84.44% 1. 60 .01 .03% 
3 USA -4.64 1. 37 1345.49% -1. 76 2.79 55.86% 
4 Brazil .90 -.01 4.96% 1. 90 -.25 28.15% 
5 India 1. 35 -.12 283.20% 1. 53 .06 0.67% 
6 Japan 2.33 -.37 607.44% -1.85 2.87 370.58% 
7 France 1.05 -.05 54.65% 3.88 -1. 89 877.19% 
8 Germany 1.14 -.07 92.62% 4.40 -2.32 1015.38% 
9 Italy 1.07 -.05 81. 74% 3.62 -1. 67 805.81% 
10 UK 1.02 -.04 44.10% 3.72 -1. 76 828.15% 
11 China 3.43 -.64 888.78% -5.63 6.01 779.60% 
12 CIS 1. 51 -.16 161.93% 6.42 -4.00 975.29% 
Notes: See Notes to Table II. 
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Symbol List 
Note: Matrices and vectors are represented as bold-faced symbols, 
scalars are not bolded. 
A. Latin Symbols 
A -C x Q matrix whose cqth element is the share of country e's income 
that is included in the dividend paid on income component security q. 
c -Country number; countries are ordered and each is given a number c, 
these numbers range from 1 to C. 
C -Total number of countries studied here. 
D -C x C matrix constructed so that for any C x 1 element vector x Dx 
equals the demeaned vector x, that is, a vector whose cth element equal 
to xc minus the mean of the C elements of x. 
F -QxC matrix, Fqc is the dollar value for country c of the utility 
increase achieved by establishing market q, as a fraction of its base­
year income. 
g -Anticipated growth rate of real per capita gross domestic product. 
G -cxc diagonal matrix whose tth diagonal element equals 
( (l+p) (l+g)a+l)-t. 
M -C x C matrix such that XM is the vector of regression residuals; 
the cth element of XM is the residual in a regression of country e's 
income on world income. 
M -C x C matrix such that XM is the vector of excess national incomes 
over each countries' share in world income; the cth element of XM is 
the income of country c minus e's share in world income, the latter 
defined as world income times x 0c/(L(c=l, .. ,C)x0c). 
P -Q x 1 vector whose qth element is the price of income component 
security q, i. e., the amount that is paid each year, t = 1, .. . ,T, 
according to the contract at time O from longs in the contract to the 
shorts; elements can be both positive or negative. 
Q -Number of markets for income component securities defined here; i. 
e., the number of distinct contract types available for use in risk 
management. 
R -In pure variance reduction case (section I of paper), a 1 x Q 
vector, whose qth element is the total dividends, over T years, paid by 
income component security q. In the utility case maximization case 
(Section II of paper), a T x Q matrix, whose tqth element is the total 
dividends paid in year t by contract q. In both cases, R = XA. 
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S -Social welfare; in pure variance reduction case (section I of 
paper) it is a weighted sum of variances. In the utility maximization 
case (section II of paper) it is a weighted sum of utilities. 
t -Year, contract year is 0, first year following contract is 1. 
T -Number of years in contract; contract pays dividends from year 1 to 
year T. 
T -Present value of T-year annuity paying $1 each year using discount 
factor v = 1/((l+p) (l+g)a-l), so that T = (v-vT+l)/(1-v). With g=3.07% 
and p=2%, T=lO gives T=6.60, T=40 gives T=ll.48; changing g to 0, T=lO 
gives T=8.98, T=40 gives T=27.36. 
Ute-Felicity, at year t, of country c. 
Uc -Utility of country c, the present value from 1 to T of felicities 
Ute· 
w -C x C diagonal matrix, whose cth diagonal element is the weight 
given to country c by the contract designer in the social welfare 
function used to derive the optimal income component securities. 
x 0 c-National income of country cat the point of linearization at year 
0 for the felicity function, nonstochastic. In our data, x 0 c is gross 
domestic product (total, not per capita) of country c in 1990, measured 
in 1985 dollars; for the CIS, 1989 gross domestic product was used. 
x 0 -C x C diagonal matrix, whose cth diagonal element is Xoc· 
X -In the pure variance reduction case (Section I of the paper), Xis 
a 1 x C vector whose cth element is the demeaned present value of real 
per capita income (gdp), from years 1 through T, of country c, 
discounted by p, and multiplied by population of country c in year 0. 
In the utility maximization case (Section II of the paper), Xis the T 
x C matrix whose tcth element is demeaned real per capita income of 
country cat year t multiplied by population in year 0. 
Yoe-Per capita income at time O in country c, equal to x 0 c divided by 
population at time O of country c. 
Yo -c x C diagonal matrix, whose cth diagonal element is Yoe· 
B. Greek Symbols 
a -Risk aversion parameter, assumed to be the same for all countries. 
~ -Q x C matrix whose qcth element is the total number of the qth 
income component securities demanded by individuals in country c. 
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y -C x 1 vector whose cth element is the slope coefficient in a 
regression of country e's income on total world income 
7 -C x 1 vector whose cth element is the share of country e's income 
in total world income in the base year. 
t -C x 1 vector, all of whose elements equal one. 
Aq -A Lagrangian multiplier for the contract designer's problem, 
corresponding to the constraint that Aq'QA.q = l, where Aq is the qth 
column of A; also the qth eigenvalue of a matrix definea in that 
problem. 
A -Q x Q diagonal matrix, whose qth diagonal element is Aq. 
µ -Q x 1 vector, whose elements are Lagrangian multipliers for the 
constraints that the Q markets clear. 
p -Subjective rate of time preference in utility function. 
Q -C x C matrix. In the pure variance reduction case (Section II of 
paper) this is the variance, conditional on information at year 0, of 
the present value of income from year 1 to T. In the utility 
maximization case (Section III of paper) Q is E0X'GX. 
Qt -c x C matrix, the variance, conditional on information at year 0, 
of real per capita income in year t times population in year 0. 
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Comparison of Basic Relations 
As Between Pure Variance Reduction and 
Utility Maximization Cases 
Pure Variance Reduction 
R = XA 
P = 0 (P not used) 
p = -A'Q = -A'OM 
Pt= A'Ot = 0 
PA= -I 
DM = D, MD= M 
A = -Mwf3 'A-1 
A = MA 
p = PM= PD 
XA = (XM)A 
M = z - t <t 'nt ) - 1 t 'n 
Mt = 0, t 'OM = 0 
M'OM = ~ 
XM = vector of residuals in re­
gression of country c total T-year 
income on T-year world income. 
A'.Qi..OA = Pwf3' = A 
M'.Q.Mwf3 I = pI A 
Calle the matrix of first Q 
eigenvectors of w· 5M'0Mw· 5 
normalized so that e'e = I, 
then P' = w-· 5 eA· 5 , where A is 
diagonal matrix 
of the eigenvalues. 
Adding kntt'Q to Q for any 
scalar k > 0 has no effect 
on A or p.
Dwf3' = -DAA 
If w = I: 
P' = -DAA 
If Q = C-1: 
M'OM = pp' and 
AP= -Mand 
1z + AP = t y <r= <t 'nt) - t 'n) 
Utility Maximization 
R = XA 
I 
1P = -a.A'Ot ( Tt 'x0 t) -
= -i~'Q + TP'x0 /a) = -A'OM 
!. = A X0 t = 0 
A= -I 
DM = D, MD = M 
A = -.Mwy-ax-1~, A-1 
_ -- 0 0
A = MA 
~ = ~M = ~D 
xi. = (XM)A
M = I - t ( t 'x0 t ) -
1 t 'x0 
Mt= 0, t'x0M = O 
M' x 0M = x 0M 
XM = matrix, tcth element is 
difference between country e's 
income at year t and its share 
of world income at year t. 
Adding .kx0 tt'x0 to Q for any 
scalar k > 0 has no effect 
on A or ~-
Dwyoax;/~ I = -DAA 
If w = Y&'XJJ 
~I = -DAA 
If Q = C-1: 
&'OM = ~~' and 
A~= -Mand 
I+A~ = t'Y ('Y=(t'x0 t)-
1 t'x0 ) 
If Q oc (proportional to) x 0 , then M =Mand P = O 
More generally t'n oc t'x0 (sum columns proportional) iff M=M. 
If M = M then P = 0 . 
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